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Abstract	
The	past	is	undeniably	special	for	human	beings.	To	a	large	extent,	both	individuals	and	col-
lecTves	deﬁne	themselves	through	history.	Moreover,	humans	seem	to	have	a	special	way	of	
cogniTvely	represenTng	the	past:	episodic	memory.	As	opposed	to	other	ways	of	represent-
ing	knowledge,	remembering	the	past	in	episodic	memory	brings	with	it	the	ability	to	be-
come	a	witness.	Episodic	memory	allows	us	to	determine	what	of	our	knowledge	about	the	
past	comes	from	our	own	experience	and	thereby	what	parts	of	the	past	we	can	give	tesT-
mony	about.	In	this	arTcle,	we	aim	to	give	an	account	of	the	special	status	of	the	past	by	
asking	why	humans	have	developed	the	ability	to	give	tesTmony	about	it.	We	argue	that	the	
past	is	special	for	human	beings	because	it	is	regularly,	and	oWen	principally,	the	only	thing	
that	can	determine	present	social	realiTes	like	commitments,	enTtlements,	and	obligaTons.	
Since	the	social	eﬀects	of	the	past	oWen	do	not	leave	physical	traces	behind,	remembering	
the	past	and	the	ability	to	bear	tesTmony	it	brings,	is	necessary	in	order	to	coordinate	social	
realiTes	with	other	individuals.	
Keywords:	episodic	memory,	tesTmony,	commitments	
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1.	The	Past	is	Special	
For	human	beings,	the	past	is	special.	We	think	of	the	past	as	deﬁning	almost	all	aspects	of	
our	lives:	where	we	belong,	who	our	friends	are,	what	our	social	status	is,	what	kind	of	per-
son	we	are.	We	also	love	to	talk	about	the	past.	We	share	much	of	our	(emoTonal)	experi-
ences	with	others	(Pasupathi,	McLean,	&	Weeks,	2009;	Rimé	et	al.,	1998)	and,	according	to	
one	esTmate,	40%	of	our	conversaTonal	Tme	is	spent	telling	stories	about	past	events	
(Eggins	&	Slade,	2005;	Hirst	&	Echterhoﬀ,	2012).	In	fact,	humans	seem	to	have	a	‘retrospect-
ive	bias’	in	their	conversaTonal	behavior:	we	talk	about	our	personal	past	two	to	three	Tmes	
as	much	as	about	our	personal	future	(Demiray,	Mehl,	&	MarTn,	2018).	The	special	status	of	
the	past	is	also	reﬂected	in	the	fact	that	humans	operate	a	dedicated	‘episodic	memory’	sys-
tem	for	cogniTvely	represenTng	speciﬁc	past	events.	While	other	memory	systems	allow	us	
to	simply	‘know’	what	happened	in	the	past,	episodic	memory	also	lets	us	‘know	how	we	
know’	what	happened.	When	we	remember	a	past	event,	we	do	not	just	recall	the	event,	
we	also	know	that	we	experienced	it.	In	other	words,	episodic	memory	allows	us	to	become	
witnesses	of	the	past	and	thus	give	tesTmony	about	it.	
The	past	is	so	all-pervasively	important	for	us	that	it	might	seem	hard	to	see	that	the	
quesTon	of	why	this	should	be	the	case	is	a	genuine	puzzle.	Yet,	in	this	arTcle	we	ajempt	to	
answer	this	quesTon.	In	approaching	this	quesTon,	we	will	take	a	detour	via	thinking	about	
the	evoluTon	of	the	human	cogniTve	architecture	for	thinking	about	the	past.	If	it	is	true	
that	episodic	memory	is	a	special	way	of	represenTng	informaTon	about	past	events	that	
lets	us	‘know	how	we	know’	about	them,	then	why	did	we	develop	such	a	system?	In	other	
words,	what	is	special	about	past	events	that	requires	a	special,	metacogniTve	mechanism	
to	think	about	them?	This	quesTon,	we	think,	is	just	the	quesTon	of	why	past	events	are	es-
pecially	important	for	human	beings.		
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Our	answer	to	this	quesTon	relies	on	the	observaTon	that,	for	human	beings,	speciﬁc	
events	do	not	only	have	physical	but	also	social	eﬀects	that	may	not	leave	physical	(but	only	
mental)	traces	behind.	For	this	reason,	such	events	require	a	dedicated	capacity	allowing	us	
to	negoTate	them	eﬀecTvely	in	communicaTon.	
We	will	proceed	as	follows:	ﬁrst,	in	SecTon	2,	we	will	recapitulate	arguments	we	have	
made	elsewhere	in	more	detail	(Mahr	&	Csibra,	2018)	about	the	nature	and	human-speciﬁc	
funcTon	of	episodic	memory.	The	ability	to	remember	allows	humans	to	disTnguish	knowl-
edge	about	the	past	which	they	acquired	on	the	basis	of	their	own	experience	from	that	ac-
quired	in	other	ways.	This	ability	consTtutes	the	basis	of	tesTmony	about	the	past:	An	act	of	
tesTmony	is	an	account	about	the	past	that	is	claimed	to	be	based	on	ﬁrst-hand	experience.	
The	term	‘tesTmony’	is	someTmes	(especially	in	philosophy)	used	to	refer	to	any	act	of	so-
cial	informaTon	transmission.	This	is	emphaTcally	not	the	way	‘tesTmony’	will	be	used	here.	
Instead,	‘tesTmony’,	as	we	will	use	the	term,	refers	to	an	account	about	the	past	based	on	
ﬁrst-hand	experience	and	the	epistemic	authority	such	experience	conveys.	This	use	of	the	
term	might	evoke	associaTons	with	the	legal	domain,	where	tesTmony	is	most	commonly	
studied,	and	where	it	has	been	insTtuTonalized	as	‘eye-witness	tesTmony	under	oath.’	Yet,	
tesTmony	understood	as	‘experience-based’	communicaTon	about	the	past	is	probably	the	
most	common	form	of	talk	about	the	past	and	is	not	constrained	to	the	courtroom. 	1
‘Remembering’	(i.e.,	episodic	memory)	therefore	is	the	cogniTve	basis	of	tesTmony.	On	
this	basis,	we	previously	(Mahr	&	Csibra,	2018)	argued	that	remembering	funcTons	to	sup-
port	communicaTon	about	past	events.	However,	the	claim	that	a	fundamental	funcTon	of	
episodic	memory	is	to	facilitate	the	communicaTon	about	speciﬁc	past	events	by	enabling	
tesTmony	about	them	implies	that	communicaTon	about	such	events	is	important	enough	
	Importantly,	with	understanding	‘tesTmony’	in	this	way,	we	do	not	intend	to	make	any	claims	about	its	accu1 -
racy.	In	fact,	as	will	become	clear	(see	SecTon	5.2),	we	intend	to	account	for	crucial	ways	in	which	tesTmony	is	
commonly	found	to	be	inaccurate	(see	also	Mahr	&	Csibra,	2018).
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to	jusTfy	the	evoluTon	of	such	a	dedicated	mechanism.	It	is,	however,	not	clear	what	
grounds	this	high	importance	of	speciﬁc	past	events	to	human	beings.	
Here	we	aim	to	give	a	more	full-ﬂedged	answer	to	this	challenge	than	previously	provid-
ed. 	Thus,	in	SecTons	3	and	4,	we	tackle	the	main	quesTon	of	this	arTcle:	Why	is	the	past	2
special	for	humans?	In	other	words,	what	is	so	special	about	the	past	that	requires	a	dedi-
cated	mechanism	allowing	us	to	facilitate	communicaTon	about	it?	In	ajempTng	to	answer	
this	quesTon,	we	will	argue	that	while	the	transmission	of	informaTon	about	speciﬁc	past	
events	might	–	under	some	circumstances	–	allow	for	the	teaching	of	generic	informaTon	
and	the	disseminaTon	of	reputaTonal	informaTon	to	others,	its	main	purpose	is	to	jusTfy	
claims	about	present	social	enTTes	such	as	commitments,	enTtlements,	and	obligaTons.		
The	reason	for	this	is	that	a	large	part	of	our	social	ontology	is	reliant	on	representaTons	
of	history.	Therefore,	tesTmony	will	someTmes	be	helpful	in	coordinaTng	what	social	reali-
Tes	we	take	to	obtain.	In	SecTon	5	we	thus	develop	an	account	of	how	the	dependency	of	
many	‘social	facts’	on	parTcular	past	events	might	make	communicaTon	about	these	events	
necessary.	On	this	view,	transminng	the	events	that	causally	ground	a	given	social	fact	will	
someTmes	be	the	only	way	in	which	the	existence	of	this	fact	can	ulTmately	be	established.	
To	the	extent	that	there	is	no	other	way	to	independently	track	the	social	eﬀects	of	a	given	
event,	tesTmony	about	this	event	will	be	important	in	order	to	signal	its	existence	and	
thereby	coordinate	the	shared	representaTon	of	social	reality	with	others.		
2.	The	Nature	and	Communica1ve	Func1on	of	Episodic	Memory	
Adult	humans	seem	to	have	two	main	ways	in	which	they	can	cogniTvely	represent	informa-
Ton	about	past	events.	On	the	one	hand,	informaTon	about	speciﬁc	past	events	can	be	rep-
	Note	that,	while	our	current	moTvaTon	for	answering	this	quesTon	rests	on	our	account	of	episodic	memory	2
funcTon,	both	the	quesTon	of	why	the	past	is	special	as	well	as	our	answer	to	it	are	not	dependent	on	this	ac-
count	and	can	be	debated	independently	from	our	view	on	the	communicaTve	funcTon	of	episodic	memory.	
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resented	proposiTonally	in	semanTc	memory,	as	in	“The	Berlin	Wall	fell	on	the	night	of	
November	9th,	1989.”	While	this	way	of	represenTng	informaTon	about	events	is	common,	
humans	also	recall	events	as	rich,	quasi-perceptual	representaTons	of	speciﬁc	past	episodes	
(Mahr,	2019;	Clayton	&	Russell,	2009). 	3
However,	episodic	memories	are	more	than	just	mental	representaTons	of	speciﬁc,	past	
events	(Mahr	&	Csibra,	2018).	One	represents	in	episodic	memory	not	only	that	a	given	
event	occurred,	uniquely,	in	the	past,	but	further	how	one	came	to	acquire	informaTon	
about	this	event:	By	having	had	ﬁrst-hand	experience	of	it	(Dokic,	2001;	Perner	&	Ruﬀman,	
1995).	This	is	illustrated	by	the	fact	that	while	even	infants	demonstrate	the	capacity	for	re-
calling	unique	events	(Bauer	&	Leventon,	2013;	Maguire	&	Mullally,	2014),	only	children	
around	5	years	of	age	seem	to	be	able	to	represent	such	unique	events	as	sources	of	their	
beliefs	(Haigh	&	Robinson,	2009).	It	is	this	addiTonal	piece	of	source	informaTon	that	
grounds	the	‘autonoeTc’	character	of	episodic	memory	(Tulving,	1983;	2002).	Episodic	
memory	proper	therefore	is	the	outcome	of	inferenTal	processes	making	explicit	the	way	in	
which	a	given	event	representaTon	relates	to	a	given	belief	about	a	past	event:	namely,	as	a	
source	of	this	belief	(Burge,	1993;	Teroni,	2014).	In	other	words,	when	we	remember	the	
past,	we	commonly	take	ourselves	to	believe	in	the	occurrence	of	whatever	we	remember	
because	we	experienced	it.		
	Recently,	a	lot	of	research	on	episodic	memory	in	cogniTve	psychology	and	cogniTve	neuroscience	has	fo3 -
cused	on	the	neuro-cogniTve	similari'es	between	remembering	the	past	and	imagining	the	future	(e.g.	Addis,	
2018;	Schater	et	al.,	2012).	However,	it	seems	to	be	someTmes	forgojen	in	this	research	eﬀort	that	remem-
bering	the	past	and	imagining	the	future	are	obviously	and	crucially	diﬀerent	acTviTes	(Mahr,	2019).	Even	
though	these	capaciTes	might	share	a	neuro-cogniTve	substrate,	they	must	have	obviously	been	subject	to	
diﬀerent	selecTon	pressures	(e.g.	Hoerl	&	McCormack,	2019):	the	past	plays	a	fundamentally	diﬀerent	role	in	
our	lives	than	the	future	does	(Mahr,	in	press).
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2.1.	The	role	of	sources	in	communica1on	
CommunicaTon	amounts	to	an	ajempt	by	a	sender	of	informaTon	to	inﬂuence	a	receiv-
er’s	mind	in	a	speciﬁc	way	(Dawkins	&	Krebs,	1987;	Krebs	&	Dawkins	,1978;	Sperber	&	Wil-
son,	1995).	For	complex,	reciprocal	systems	of	communicaTon	to	remain	evoluTonarily	sta-
ble,	mechanisms	have	to	be	in	place	assuring	that	communicaTve	behavior	remains	(on	the	
whole)	beneﬁcial	for	both	senders	and	receivers.	
On	the	one	hand,	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	overall	inﬂuence	of	the	communicated	in-
formaTon	is	beneﬁcial	for	them,	receivers	must	have	capaciTes	allowing	them	to	scruTnize	
sources	for	trustworthiness,	reliability	and	competence,	and	communicated	informaTon	for	
believability	(Sperber	et	al.,	2010;	Mercier,	2017;	2020).	If	such	‘epistemic	vigilance’	mechan-
isms	were	not	in	place,	receivers	would	not	be	able	to	judge	which	pieces	of	communicated	
informaTon	they	ought	to	believe.	Consequently,	receivers	would	oWen	be	misled	and	ex-
ploited	by	senders	and	thus,	on	average,	not	gain	from	ajending	to	communicaTve	signals.	
On	the	other	hand,	speakers	require	capaciTes	allowing	them	to	inﬂuence	receivers’	minds	
eﬀecTvely	in	spite	of	such	vigilance.	Both	the	mechanisms	of	epistemic	vigilance	and	the	
mechanisms	to	overcome	such	vigilance	are	crucially	dependent	on	the	cogniTve	capacity	to	
represent	source	informaTon.		
One	way	in	which	source	informaTon	is	important	is	because	it	can	serve	as	a	reason	
(Mercier	&	Sperber,	2011;	2017;	Mercier,	2016).	On	the	side	of	the	sender,	reasons	are	im-
portant	insofar	as	one	can	supply	them	to	convince	an	interlocutor	who	would	otherwise	
not	accept	what	one	has	to	say	based	on	trust	alone.	Thus,	if	someone	can	point	to	whatev-
er	caused	them	to	believe	something	(their	own	reasons),	this	might	be	good	enough	for	
others	to	believe	it,	too.	On	the	side	of	the	receiver,	one	has	to	be	able	to	tell	good	reasons	
from	bad	ones	when	deciding	what	to	believe.	This	also	means	that	the	bejer	senders	are	at	
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giving	reasons	the	bejer	receivers	should	be	at	processing	and	scruTnizing	those	reasons,	
and	vice	versa.		
2.2.	The	communica1ve	func1on	of	episodic	memory	
Source	informaTon	is	also	important	in	communicaTon	because	it	allows	speakers	to	
regulate	their	conversaTonal	commitments.	Making	an	asserTon	commits	the	speaker	to	the	
truth	of	whatever	she	asserts	(Brandom,	1983;	Turri,	2011):	The	speaker	accepts	that	if	she	
is	found	to	be	wrong	she	will	incur	direct	or	reputaTonal	costs.	The	fact	that	the	speaker	is	
willing	to	incur	such	costs	can	serve	as	a	signal	for	her	audience	to	accept	whatever	she	
claims.	Thus,	the	stronger	a	speaker	commits	to	a	claim,	the	more	convincing	she	should	be	
(Mazzarella	et	al.,	2018;	Vullioud	et	al.,	2016).	Therefore,	speakers	should	be	able	to	regulate	
such	commitment	appropriately	since	over-	(or	under-)	commitment	can	be	costly.	One	of	
the	basic	ways	in	which	such	commitments	can	be	regulated	is	by	claiming	or	deferring	epis-
temic	authority	about	whatever	one	asserts	(McMyler,	2007).	If	the	speaker	claims	to	have	
acquired	the	informaTon	in	quesTon	ﬁrst-hand,	she	at	once	claims	epistemic	authority	and	
makes	herself	directly	accountable	for	the	truth	of	her	asserTon.	This	should	in	turn	cause	
the	speaker	to	be	more	strongly	commijed	and	hence	more	convincing	compared	to	a	case	
in	which	she	defers	accountability	to	another,	second-hand	source.	RepresenTng	and	being	
able	to	communicate	sources	can	thereby	serve	a	variety	of	goals:	sources	can	be	used	to	
convince	(“I	saw	it	with	my	own	eyes”),	to	take	credit	(“I	found	the	soluTon	on	my	own”),	or	
to	hedge	one’s	bets	(“It’s	only	something	I’ve	heard”)	(see	e.g.	Altay	&	Mercier,	2019;	Silver	
&	Shaw,	2018;	Shaw	&	Olson	2015).		
Considering	the	extent	to	which	source	informaTon	is	therefore	useful	in	communica-
Ton,	it	is	not	surprising	that	such	informaTon	is	grammaTcalized	in	about	one	quarter	of	all	
recorded	languages	as	evidenTal	markers	(Aikhenvald,	2004;	Nagel,	2015).	Moreover,	even	
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languages	who	do	not	encode	evidenTality	grammaTcally,	have	numerous	other	ways	to	ex-
press	a	speaker’s	source	(Aikhenvaled,	2004).	
Episodic	memory	thus	allows	us	to	do	two	things:	(1)	represent	the	grounds	on	which	we	
formed	a	given	belief	in	the	ﬁrst	place,	which	we	can	then	transmit	as	reasons	to	others	or	
use	to	decide	when	to	change	our	mind,	and	(2)	regulate	the	extent	of	our	commitments	in	
discourse	by	highlighTng	whether	a	given	event	representaTon	originated	in	our	own	ﬁrst-
hand	experience	or	not	(see	also	Jablonka,	2017;	Poole,	2008;	for	a	view	applying	a	similar	
idea	to	collecTve	memory	see	Seeman,	2016).	Of	course,	this	is	only	the	ﬁrst	layer	in	a	com-
plex	web	of	potenTal	source	informaTon.	On	the	basis	of	an	episodic	representaTon	we	can	
discern	whether	we	have	seen,	heard,	inferred	etc.	informaTon	about	a	given	event	(John-
son	et	al.,	1993).	Such	more	ﬁne-grained	source	disTncTons	are	important	because	they	al-
low	one	to	calibrate	the	communicaTve	eﬀects	of	one’s	statements	as	well	as	answer	poten-
Tal	challenges	to	one’s	authority	(“How	do	you	know?”)	more	precisely	than	simple	expres-
sions	of	conﬁdence	would	(Vulioud	et	al.,	2016)	and	might	further	be	useful	in	deciding	what	
is	informaTve	for	one’s	audience	(Nagel,	2015).	
2.3.	Why	do	we	care	about	the	past?		
If	the	above	account	of	episodic	memory	is	correct,	remembering	allows	humans	to	give	
tesTmony:	it	allows	us	to	decide	when	we	can	speak	about	the	past	as	witnesses,	that	is,	on	
the	basis	of	ﬁrst-hand	experience.	But	why	are	representaTons	of	speciﬁc,	past	events	im-
portant	enough	to	require	the	inclusion	of	source	informaTon	in	the	ﬁrst	place?	In	principle,	
one	might	think	that	such	a	system	could	apply	to	the	representaTon	of	any	type	of	informa-
Ton,	including	semanTc,	proposiTonal	facts.	Autonoesis,	however,	is	speciﬁc	to	representa-
Tons	of	unique,	past	events,	regulaTng	the	speaker’s	communicaTve	commitments	for	
claims	about	such	events	and	allowing	listeners	to	decide	when	to	revise	their	beliefs.	In	
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other	words,	if	autonoesis	indeed	serves	as	a	signal	of	epistemic	authority,	why	is	it	speciﬁc	
to	past	events?	What	is	so	special	about	the	past	that	requires	a	dedicated	mechanism	man-
aging	claims	of	epistemic	authority	about	it?	Why	are	claims	about	history	important	
enough	to	require	jusTﬁcaTon?	
One	way	to	approach	this	quesTon	might	be	by	thinking	about	how	knowledge	about	
the	past	can	be	relevant	to	human	ﬁtness.	Changes	in	ﬁtness	can	inherently	only	exploit	
possibiliTes	in	the	present	and	future	(Klein	et	al.,	2002),	but	there	are	two	obvious	ways	in	
which	knowledge	about	the	past	can	nonetheless	be	ﬁtness	relevant.	On	the	one	hand,	
knowledge	about	the	past	might	support	the	learning	of	regulariTes	in	our	environment.	If	
we	know	what	happened,	we	might	be	able	to	use	this	informaTon	to	inducTvely	infer	regu-
lariTes	in	the	way	our	environment	works	and	therefore	form	appropriate	expectaTons	
about	what	will	happen.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	knowing	about	the	past	can	be	im-
portant	because	some	past	causes	have	eﬀects	that	only	manifest	aWer	some	Tme	in	the	fu-
ture	(as	in	the	case	of	infecTons,	for	example).	In	this	way,	knowing	what	happened	might	
allow	one	to	predict	what	will	happen	or	what	is	the	case.	Now,	can	we	apply	these	insights	
to	the	quesTon	of	when	the	transmission	of	informaTon	about	the	past	might	be	ﬁtness	rel-
evant?	AWer	all,	episodic	memory	is	structured	so	as	to	facilitate	the	transmission	of	inform-
aTon	about	the	past	and	the	special	status	of	the	past	seems	to	be	parTcularly	prominent	in	
human	social	life.	
It	might	seem	plausible	to	answer	this	quesTon	by	poinTng	to	the	fact	that	the	commu-
nicaTve	transmission	of	a	past	occurrence	could	funcTon	as	quasi-experience	for	others	to	
form	judgments	about.	If	we	can	transmit	our	own	experience	to	someone	else,	to	the	ex-
tent	that	our	interlocutor	believes	us,	she	might	vicariously	learn	from	this	experience	just	as	
if	it	was	her	own.	This	fact	alone	would	be	a	good	reason	to	someTmes	require	jusTﬁcaTon	
for	claims	about	the	past.	However,	not	all	judgments	are	equally	well	transmijed	in	this	
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way:	learning	from	social	informaTon	transmission	will	usually	beneﬁt	most	from	generic	
statements	rather	than	claims	about	speciﬁc	events.	AWer	all,	one	of	the	greatest	beneﬁts	of	
human	communicaTon	is	that	we	can	transmit	generic	informaTon	directly	to	others,	
without	being	reliant	on	individual	learning	episodes	(Csibra	&	Gergely,	2011).		
Moreover,	it	is	not	clear	what	role	the	‘pastness’	of	our	experience	would	play	in	allow-
ing	others	to	learn	from	it.	The	transmission	of	informaTon	about	speciﬁc	past	events	is	not	
idenTcal	to	the	transmission	of	informaTon	about	speciﬁc	events	in	general.	That	is,	instead	
of	asking	what	we	can	vicariously	learn	from	the	transmission	of	informaTon	about	speciﬁc	
events,	we	have	to	ask	what	we	can	learn	from	the	retrospecTve	representaTon	of	such	
events	that	is	important	enough	for	event	informaTon	to	play	a	role	in	its	transmission.		
In	what	follows,	we	will	therefore	explore	what	kinds	of	judgments	(1)	are	parTcularly	
sensiTve	to	the	kind	of	evidence	provided	by	claims	about	speciﬁc	past	events	and	(2)	carry	
parTcularly	high	social	consequence	so	that	humans	would	care	about,	and	consequently	
regularly	require	addiTonal	reassurance	in	their	transmission.		
3.	The	Past	Supports	Learning:	Generics	and	Reputa1ons	
When	asked	what	kind	of	inferences	are	well	supported	by	reference	to	past	events,	most	
would	feel	inclined	to	point	to	inducTon.	Clearly,	to	the	extent	that	a	given	judgment	is	sup-
ported/supportable	by	inducTve	inference,	it	will	beneﬁt	from	reference	to	past	
experience. 	We	might	thus	care	about	what	happened	on	parTcular	occasions	in	the	past	4
because	such	events	increase	the	potenTal	sampling	base	behind	our	inducTve	inferences	
leading	to	our	generic	beliefs.	AWer	all,	one	way	to	arrive	at	a	generic	belief	is	by	generalizing	
	One	way	to	spell	out	this	intuiTon	is	to	say	that	tesTmony	is	appropriate	in	facilitaTng	the	transmission	of	a	4
given	judgment	to	the	extent	that	this	judgment	is	projecTble	(Goodman,	1983).	Roughly,	a	judgment	is	pro-
jecTble	if	it	licenses	generalizaTon	from	a	circumscribed	sample	to	a	general	conclusion,	that	is,	if	it	licenses	
inducTon.	The	kinds	of	representaTons	that	are	sensiTve	to	inducTon	are	generic	beliefs.	
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over	speciﬁc	instances.	Thus,	the	claim	that	“It	rains	on	Thursdays	in	Los	Angeles”	could	be	
supported	by	poinTng	out	that	it	rained	when	I	was	there	on	Thursday	last	week	(i.e.	my	tes-
Tmony).		
However,	while	inducTve	learning	can	be	supported	by	evidence	from	speciﬁc	past	
events,	neither	the	speciﬁcity	nor	the	pastness	of	such	events	is	important	for	such	learning	
(if	it	is	Thursday	today	and	it	is	raining	in	Los	Angeles	now	this	takes	nothing	away	from	the	
inducTve	power	of	the	event).	What	majers	instead	is	that	the	speciﬁc	instance	of	an	occur-
rence	follows	a	regularity	that	allows	for	generalizaTon.	Thus,	generic	beliefs	are	only	sub-
opTmally	jusTﬁed	by	retrospecTvely	poinTng	to	parTculars	simply	because	individual	cases	
might	not	say	much	about	the	general	pajern	under	scruTny.	If	one	inducTvely	generalizes	
over	a	number	of	instances,	one	disregards	exactly	what	is	parTcular	about	each	one.	The	
eﬀecTveness	of	poinTng	to	a	speciﬁc	experience	in	jusTfying	a	generic	claim	will	therefore	
commonly	be	limited	simply	because	that	experience	could	be	an	outlier. 	The	fact	that	it	5
rained	last	Thursday	in	Los	Angeles	does	not	necessitate,	aWer	all,	that	it	will	normally	rain	
there	on	Thursdays.	
Moreover,	while	poinTng	to	speciﬁc	past	events	can	be	helpful	for	the	jusTﬁcaTon	of	in-
ducTvely	derivable	generics,	generic	beliefs	are	sensiTve	to	all	kinds	of	evidence.	Your	gen-
eral	meteorological	knowledge,	for	example,	might	tell	you	that	the	weather	is	unlikely	to	
conform	to	the	days	of	the	week.	Thus,	generic	beliefs	are	not	dependent	on	reference	to	
speciﬁc	past	events	in	order	to	be	jusTﬁable	and	can	also	be	eﬀecTvely	transmijed	by	refer-
ence	to	other	generic	facts	one	holds	true	(Prasada,	2000).	
	To	be	clear,	we	are	not	claiming	that	claims	about	history	cannot	be	used	in	order	to	support	inducTve	gener5 -
alizaTon;	they	are	simply	not	well	suited	to	do	so.
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3.1.	Bounding	and	exemplifying	generics	
There	are,	however,	two	other	potenTally	more	eﬀecTve	ways	in	which	the	transmission	
of	generics	can	be	supported	by	claims	about	speciﬁc	events.	First,	as	Klein	et	al.	(2002;	see	
also	Cosmides	&	Tooby,	2000)	have	pointed	out,	claims	about	speciﬁc	events	can	set	bounds	
on	how	far	a	generalizaTon	might	extend.	Going	back	to	the	example	of	“It	rains	on	Thurs-
days	in	Los	Angeles”:	PoinTng	out	that	it	did	not	rain	when	I	was	there	last	Thursday	pro-
vides	a	good	counterexample.	The	universally	quanTﬁed	version	of	this	asserTon	(“It	rains	
every	Thursday	in	Los	Angeles”)	can	simply	not	be	true	if	this	speciﬁc	event	occurred.	
Knowledge	about	speciﬁc	events	can	therefore	allow	listeners	to	debate	the	scope	of	an	as-
serTon.	The	bounding	funcTon	of	speciﬁc	events	seems	parTcularly	useful	for	the	purposes	
of	epistemic	vigilance:	if	we	are	confronted	with	a	universal	claim,	but	we	can	come	up	with	
a	speciﬁc	instance	in	which	it	did	not	hold,	we	should,	if	at	all,	only	accept	a	more	modest	
version	of	the	claim	in	quesTon.		
Second,	instead	of	being	just	one	more	data	point	for	an	inducTve	generalizaTon,	com-
municated	informaTon	about	a	speciﬁc	event	might	serve	as	an	exemplar	(ShaWo	et	al.,	
2008;	2014):	a	general	pajern	might	be	‘illustrated’	and	thereby	supported	by	poinTng	to	
one	speciﬁc,	diagnosTc	instance	in	which	it	occurred	(cf.	“strong	sampling,”	Xu	&	Tenen-
baum,	2007).	You	might,	having	never	encountered	a	panda	bear,	wonder	whether	they	are	
dangerous.	You	ask	a	zookeeper,	who	tells	you	that	he	was	bijen	by	one	once.	On	the	one	
hand,	as	discussed	above,	this	might	cause	you	to	inducTvely	increase	your	belief	in	the	hy-
pothesis	that	panda	bears	are	indeed	dangerous.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	the	simple	
fact	that	the	zookeeper	chose	this	speciﬁc	episode	from	his	experiences	with	panda	bears	to	
answer	your	quesTon	should	cause	you	to	treat	this	informaTon	as	being	diagnosTc	of	a	
more	general	pajern	of	panda	bear	behavior.	In	other	words,	this	episode	would	not	make	
the	hypothesis	that	panda	bears	are	dangerous	more	believable	because	it	would	provide	
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one	more	instance	to	inducTvely	generalize	from.	Instead,	the	listener	will	assume	that	the	
speaker	picked	that	episode	to	share	because	it	provides	the	best	example	to	learn	from	and	
this	in	turn	would	make	the	target	claim	more	convincing.	A	speciﬁc	event	can	therefore	
serve	to	jusTfy	a	general	claim	in	virtue	of	its	exemplary	character.	
One	beneﬁt	of	poinTng	to	speciﬁc	events	as	exemplars	is	thereby	that	one	does	not	
have	to	make	explicit	the	target	claim	one	aims	to	transmit.	Simply	poinTng	out	that	“I	was	
bijen	by	a	panda	bear	once”	will	someTmes	be	enough	to	make	one’s	audience	infer	that	
they	must	be	dangerous.	Providing	exemplars,	however,	will	likely	be	mostly	necessary	when	
reasons	in	support	of	a	prior	claim	are	requested.	AWer	all,	as	menToned	above,	one	of	the	
main	advantages	of	communicaTon	in	the	ﬁrst	place	is	that	we	can	transmit	ready-made	
generalizaTons	to	others.	Only	when	challenged,	will	poinTng	to	a	speciﬁc	episode	(in	the	
form	of	tesTmony)	become	necessary.	
According	to	what	we	have	discussed	so	far	then,	we	should	expect	people	to	care	about	
what	happened	at	speciﬁc	occasions	in	the	past	primarily	because	(1)	past	events	can	set	
bounds	on	generics,	allowing	us	to	evaluate	and	contradict	them,	and	(2)	because	past	
events	can	serve	as	exemplars	for	transminng	generics	to	others	in	argumentaTon	and	
teaching.		
3.2.	Dissemina1ng	reputa1ons	
Humans	can	teach,	argue	for	and	evaluate	almost	anything	by	poinTng	to	exemplifying	
events	(or	chains	of	events).	In	these	cases,	providing	reasons	in	the	form	of	speciﬁc	events	
funcTons	according	to	the	same	principles	as	argumentaTon	in	general	(Mercier	&	Sperber,	
2017).	A	claim	will	require	jusTﬁcaTon	if	the	audience	does	not	trust	the	speaker	enough	to	
accept	her	claim	on	that	basis	alone.	Consequently,	jusTﬁcaTon	will	be	required	when	the	
stakes	of	being	misled	or	the	incenTves	to	mislead	are	high.		
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While	this	is	true	in	many	speciﬁc	contexts,	a	domain	where	these	condiTons	are	met	
very	consistently	are	claims	aﬀecTng	others’	reputaTon.	According	to	Dunbar	(2004),	the	
most	common	topic	of	conversaTon	is	social	evaluaTons:	As	much	as	65%	of	casual	conver-
saTon	concerns	social	topics	(about	others’	interacTons,	behaviors	and	traits)	(Dunbar,	Dun-
can,	&	Marrioj,	1997).	People’s	interest	in	others’	behaviors	and	interacTons	is	enormous	
even	when	they	themselves	are	not	involved	(DeScioli	&	Kurzban,	2009),	and	this	pajern	
does	not	seem	to	be	exclusive	to	Western	socieTes:	Zinacantan	people	in	Mexico	similarly	
have	been	reported	to	spend	78%	of	conversaTonal	Tme	talking	about	such	social	topics	
(Haviland,	1977).		
This	phenomenon	is	commonly	termed	‘gossip’	(Foster	2004)	and	has	been	proposed	to	
be	essenTal	in	the	stabilizaTon	of	cooperaTve	group	living	(Dunbar,	1998;	Wu,	Balliet,	&	Van	
Lange,	2015;	2016a;	2016b).	Dunbar	(2004)	has	argued	that	the	transmission	of	social	evalu-
aTons	plays	an	essenTal	role	in	the	stabilizaTon	of	our	condiTons	of	communal	living.	The	
reason	for	this	is	that	informaTon	about	someone’s	past	behaviors	are	oWen	taken	to	be	dia-
gnosTc	about	her	future	behavior;	that	is,	that	such	informaTon	potenTally	licenses	trait	in-
ferences. 	Once	trait	judgments	become	shared	across	a	group,	they	develop	into	reputa6 -
Tonal	informaTon.		
By	disseminaTng	reputaTonal	informaTon	through	a	given	social	group,	the	transmission	
of	social	evaluaTons	allows	us	to	go	beyond	our	personal	experience	when	assessing	the	
state	of	our	social	network	and	the	disposiTons	of	others	(Sommerfeld	et	al.,	2007).	This	in	
turn	is	taken	to	fulﬁll	‘policing’	funcTons	(Foster,	2004),	eﬀecTvely	implemenTng	a	form	of	
social	control	because	what	someone	believes	about	others’	traits	will	determine	who	she	
associates	with	and	how	she	interacts	with	them.	Therefore,	if	one	can	manipulate	others’	
	Crucially,	such	trait-inferences	do	not	have	to	be	valid	as	research	on	phenomena	such	as	the	‘fundamental	6
ajribuTon	error’	(Ross,	1977)	and	the	‘correspondence	bias’	(Gilbert	&	Malone,	1995)	shows.
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opinions	about	a	speciﬁc	person,	one	can	eﬀecTvely	control	coaliTonal	associaTons	as	well	
as	cooperaTve	opportuniTes.	This	explains	why	people	gossip	so	much	about	others’	past	
behaviors	and	are	careful	about	tracking	(their	own	and	others’)	sources	of	this	informaTon	
(Wilson	et	al.,	2000).	They	have	to	jusTfy,	and	be	vigilant	against	being	misled	about	claims	
aﬀecTng	others’	reputaTon	because	of	the	various	ways	one	could	take	advantage	of	chan-
ging	someone's	reputaTon	(Hess	&	Hage,	2006).	Indeed,	one’s	conversaTonal	commitments	
are	rarely	more	important	than	in	the	domain	of	gossip.	Where	a	piece	of	gossip	originates	
from,	and	how	far	a	given	speaker	is	removed	from	having	experienced	the	episode	in	ques-
Ton	herself,	are	crucial	both	for	how	believable	the	gossip	is	and	who	is	responsible	for	it	
(Giardini	&	Conte,	2011).		
4.	The	Past	Generates	En1tlements,	Obliga1ons,	and	Commitments	
So	far,	we	have	idenTﬁed	generic	beliefs	as	one	kind	of	judgment	the	transmission	of	which	
can	be	supported	by	referring	to	speciﬁc	past	events.	Moreover,	we	have	argued	that	the	
transmission	of	judgments	about	others’	traits	and	disposiTons	are	a	domain	where	incen-
Tves	to	mislead	and	risks	to	be	misled	are	regularly	high.	That	is,	we	should	expect	source	
claims	and	the	modiﬁcaTon	of	conversaTonal	commitments	they	allow	(i.e.,	tesTmony)	to	
be	parTcularly	important	in	the	transmission	of	trait	judgments;	i.e.,	in	gossip.	Claims	about	
speciﬁc	past	events	are,	however,	not	only	relevant	in	the	transmission	of	generic	beliefs,	
and	generic	beliefs	can	be	transmijed	without	ever	referring	to	such	events.	In	fact,	as	men-
Toned	above,	past	events	play	a	role	in	the	transmission	of	generic	beliefs	not	necessarily	in	
virtue	of	the	speciﬁcity	or	pastness	of	these	events	but	rather	as	input	to	inducTve	learning	
machinery	or	as	examples	of	a	more	general	pajern.	To	explain	why	the	past	for	its	own	
sake	seems	to	have	such	a	special	status	for	human	beings,	we	should	look	for	a	domain	in	
which	retrospecTve	reference	to	parTculars	is	required.		
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A	further	reason	for	why	the	transmission	of	generics,	including	reputaTon,	may	not	
provide	a	suﬃcient	evoluTonary	pressure	for	the	development	of	tesTmony	is	the	fact	that	
the	main	beneﬁciaries	of	teaching	and	of	the	spread	of	reputaTonal	informaTon	are	the	re-
cipients	of	such	communicaTon:	They	acquire	knowledge	to	be	used	in	the	future,	which	
may	have	ﬁtness	consequences.	While	there	might	be	other	factors	that	would	make	these	
types	of	communicaTon	ﬁtness	enhancing	for	communicators	(e.g.,	reputaTonal	gain),	these	
would	only	be	indirect	beneﬁts.	It	is	therefore	worth	asking	if	there	is	an	explanaTon	that	
relies	on	direct	ﬁtness	enhancement	for	the	person	who	gives	tesTmony.	How	could	the	
speaker’s,	as	opposed	to	others’,	ﬁtness	beneﬁt	from	tesTmony?	
4.1.	Type	and	token	causes	
One	domain	where	this	might	be	the	case	is	causal	judgments.	The	relaTonship	between	
past	and	present	is	commonly	conceived	of	in	terms	of	causal	relaTons.	People	constantly	
infer	causal	relaTons	between	events	unfolding	around	them	(Gopnik,	2000).	Nevertheless,	
while	causes	are	events,	the	representaTon	of	causal	relaTons	as	such	does	not	require	the	
representaTon	of	speciﬁc	events:	causes	are	oWen	represented	in	terms	of	‘type	
causaTon’	(“being	shot	kills	people”).	What	does	require	the	representaTon	of	a	speciﬁc	
event,	however,	is	the	retrospecTve	inference	from	a	speciﬁc,	token	eﬀect	to	its	token	cause	
(“Mark	died	because	he	was	shot”).	Crucially,	such	a	retrospecTve	inference	requires	not	
just	the	representaTon	of	an	event	as	the	cause	of	an	eﬀect,	but	also	its	representaTon	as	
having	occurred	temporally	before	the	eﬀect,	i.e.,	in	the	past.	Moreover,	while	in	principle	
an	unbounded	set	of	causes	underlie	any	given	eﬀect,	humans	commonly	represent	causes	
and	their	eﬀects	as	standing	in	a	one-to-one	relaTonship;	in	other	words,	speciﬁc	token	ef-
fects	are	oWen	represented	as	having	speciﬁc	token	causes.	Token	causal	judgments	then	
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have	all	the	qualiTes	that	would	seem	to	make	the	representaTon	of	past	events	necessary	
in	order	to	link	causes	to	eﬀects.		
Token	causal	judgment	is	a	domain	in	which	parTculars	(i.e.,	speciﬁc	past	events	and	
their	counterfactual	derivaTves)	are	crucial	(Campbell,	1996).	Epistemic	authority	about	the	
actual	occurrence	of	speciﬁc	past	events	might	thus	majer	parTcularly	in	the	transmission	
of	causal	judgments	as	causal	explanaTons. 	Note,	that	type	causal	explanaTon	requires	7
claims	about	the	past	experience	of	a	speciﬁc	event	only	in	so	far	as	they	are	relevant	to	the	
transmission	of	generic	causal	beliefs	more	generally.	Claims	to	personal	experience	will,	
thus,	be	parTcularly	powerful	in	the	transmission	of	token	causal	judgments.	
4.2.	Physical	and	social	eﬀects		
The	beneﬁts	of	making	token	causal	judgments	may	depend	on	the	nature	of	the	eﬀect	
in	quesTon.	Finding	a	token	cause	for	a	physical	eﬀect	is	an	inference	to	a	speciﬁc,	past	
event,	but	establishing	this	causal	relaTon	aﬀects	our	future	ﬁtness	only	to	the	extent	that	it	
allows	us	to	inducTvely	generalize	it	(and	use	this	generalizaTon,	for	example,	in	planning	
future	acTons).	While	causal	thinking	is	a	powerful	learning	engine	allowing	us	to	under-
stand,	predict	and	explain	conTngencies	in	our	environment,	these	beneﬁts	only	parTally	
apply	to	thinking	in	terms	of	token	causes:	parTcular	instances	of	causaTon	serve	as	learning	
opportuniTes	mostly	in	light	of	our	capacity	for	building	causal	maps	from	representaTons	
of	type	causal	relaTons.	Moreover,	token	instances	of	causaTon	can	usually	only	be	inter-
preted	through	the	applicaTon	of	type	causal	assumpTons	and	serve	as	opportuniTes	for	
learning	only	in	so	far	as	they	inform	these	assumpTons.	In	the	physical	domain,	token	
causal	judgments	are	therefore	most	important	as	inputs	for	inducTve	learning	mechanisms.	
	In	order	to	play	a	role	in	causal	judgment	itself,	the	representaTon	of	event	informaTon	is	suﬃcient.	Epis7 -
temic	authority	about	the	event	in	quesTon	(and	hence	remembering	proper)	only	becomes	relevant	in	the	
transmission	of	such	causal	judgments.
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As	we	have	argued	above,	however,	inducTve	inferences	are	not	opTmally	transmijed	
through	tesTmony.		
This	is	similarly	true	for	retrospecTve	causal	inference:	Say	you	arrive	in	your	oﬃce	one	
day	to	ﬁnd	that	your	computer	screen	is	lying	on	the	ﬂoor	and	does	not	work	anymore.	
When	you	ask	your	oﬃce-mate	what	happened,	she	informs	you	that	one	of	your	co-work-
ers	threw	your	screen	on	the	ground	in	a	ﬁt	of	frustraTon.	Regarding	the	purely	physical	
cause-eﬀect	relaTons	at	play	here,	this	informaTon	will	be	relevant	to	you	in	so	far	as	it	in-
forms	you	that	computer	screens	tend	to	stop	working	when	thrown	on	the	ground.	That	is,	
you	will	beneﬁt	from	knowing	the	physical	cause	of	why	your	screen	stopped	working	in	so	
far	as	you	can	infer	a	type	causal	relaTonship	from	this	speciﬁc	instance.	You	might	then,	for	
example,	ﬁx	your	screen	to	your	desk	so	as	to	avoid	it	falling	or	being	thrown	on	the	ground	
in	the	future.	In	this	way	(i.e.,	via	a	type	causal	inference),	informaTon	about	token	causal	
relaTons	can	impact	your	future	behavior	adapTvely.		
For	humans,	however,	causes	instanTated	in	speciﬁc	past	events	are	oWen	more	than	
opportuniTes	for	learning	about	our	physical	environment	via	type	causal	inferences;	they	
may	have	important	social	implicaTons,	too.	Many	physical	or	biological	causes	produce	not	
only	physical	but	also	social	eﬀects.	If	I	manually	create	an	arTfact,	I	may	earn	rights	to	use	it	
or	own	it;	if	my	aunt	dies,	I	may	inherit	some	of	her	property;	if	your	dog	kills	my	lamb,	you	
may	have	to	compensate	me;	if	I	father	a	child,	I	may	have	to	contribute	to	her	upbringing;	if	
a	landslide	destroys	my	crop,	I	may	be	relieved	from	the	duty	of	contribuTng	to	the	common	
good;	etc.	
Note	that	while	some,	but	not	all,	of	these	events	are	acTons	of	social	agents,	all	of	them	
produce	lasTng	changes	in	the	physical	environment.	However,	crucially,	they	also	produce	
social	facts:	Someone	becomes/ceases	to	be	the	owner	of	a	resource,	a	father,	a	debtor,	etc.,	
thereby	producing	enTtlements	and	obligaTons	that	have	ﬁtness	consequences	for	the	fu-
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ture.	And	because,	unlike	the	physical/biological	eﬀects	of	the	same	causes,	these	social	
facts	are	not	perceivable,	only	the	causes	that	produced	them	in	the	past	prove	that	they	
obtain.	In	fact,	these	causes	are	thought	to	play	a	consTtuTve	role	in	them.	To	a	large	extent,	
this	explains	why	we	are	bound	to	care	so	much	about	speciﬁc	past	events	(including	their	
actual	details).	
Going	back	to	the	example	of	the	broken	screen	above:	The	crucial	inference	you	will	
likely	draw	from	the	informaTon	that	your	co-worker	threw	your	screen	on	the	ground	will	
in	fact	not	be	a	type-causal	relaTon.	Instead,	you	will	form	an	accountability	judgment	that	
serves	as	the	basis	for	a	claim	to	an	enTtlement	for	compensaTon.	That	is,	in	this	case,	
knowing	the	speciﬁc	token	cause	will	have	an	eﬀect	on	your	future	ﬁtness	not	(primarily)	by	
allowing	you	to	learn	about	type	causal	relaTons	but	by	allowing	you	to	infer	and	transmit	
the	social	eﬀects	produced	conTngently	with	the	physical	ones.	
4.3.	When	tes1mony	is	necessary:	communica1vely	generated	commitments	
People	see	certain	physical	events	as	generaTng	(and	someTmes	even	consTtuTng)	so-
cial	eﬀects.	Thus,	occurrences	of	certain	speciﬁc	past	events	can	inform	us	about	present	
and	future	social	enTtlements	and	obligaTons,	and	since	these	social	eﬀects	exist	primarily	
as	mental	representaTons,	tesTmony	about	such	events	can	be	an	important	argument	dur-
ing	negoTaTons	of	enTtlements.	However,	strictly	speaking,	tesTmony	is	not	the	only	way	to	
prove	the	occurrence	of	such	events.	Even	though	the	social	consequences	of	such	events	
(e.g.,	the	enTtlement	for	compensaTon)	are	not	perceivable,	their	conTngent	physical	ef-
fects	(the	broken	screen)	can	sTll	be	traceable.	This	in	turn,	at	least	in	principle,	may	allow	
retrospecTve	inference	from	eﬀects	to	their	causes	without	relying	on	the	tesTmony	of	oth-
ers.	One	can	always	try	to	do	the	detecTve	work	backwards	from	the	physical	eﬀects	to	infer,	
and	argue	for,	the	cause	and	thereby	for	its	social	eﬀect.	The	craWwork	on	an	arTfact	may	
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show	who	created	it;	the	exhumed	corpse	of	my	aunt	can	prove	that	she	really	died;	the	in-
juries	of	my	lamb	may	reveal	that	your	dog	was	the	culprit;	fatherhood	can	be	inferred	from	
DNA	tests	or	from	facial	resemblance;	the	change	of	the	landscape	provides	evidence	of	a	
landslide;	etc.	Thus,	while	tesTmony	(and	the	episodic	memory	it	requires)	is	useful	to	argue	
for	the	validity	of	a	given	social	fact	in	all	of	these	cases,	it	is	not	mandatory:	ConTngent	
physical	eﬀects	may	allow	us	to	infer	the	past	physical	(or	biological)	causes	that	induced	the	
present	social	facts	in	quesTon.	
Nonetheless,	once	the	ability	to	represent	the	social	eﬀects	of	events	emerged	in	human	
evoluTon,	it	likely	made	the	ability	to	refer	to	the	past	on	the	basis	of	remembering	it	(i.e.,	
tesTmony)	extremely	useful.	Once	in	place,	however,	this	ability	could	then	have	given	rise	
to	new	forms	of	commitments	that	do	not	necessarily	rely	on	traceable	physical	eﬀects:	
Promises,	agreements,	bets,	and	marriages	are	all	examples	of	social	eﬀects	which	do	not	
necessarily	leave	physical	traces	behind.	Instead,	they	are	generated	by	communicaTve	acts.	
These	instances	of	communicaTon	normally	have	no	correlated,	lasTng	physical	eﬀects.	
Therefore,	not	only	their	social	eﬀect	but	also	the	cause	itself	exists	only	in	the	mind	of	the	
parTcipants.		
If	Margaret	promises	Elena	that	she	will	be	back	home	by	7pm,	the	eﬀect	of	this	promise	
(i.e.,	that	Margaret	is	now	commijed	to	a	certain	behavior)	is	not	observable;	it	survives	–	if	
at	all	–	only	in	the	minds	of	Margaret	and	Elena	(and	any	possible	witnesses).	Nonetheless,	
the	promise-commitment	relaTon	here	seems	to	be	of	the	same	kind	as	the	token	cause-to-
ken	eﬀect	relaTon	described	above.	
The	proof	that	such	a	cause	occurred	could	only	come	from	tesTmony	-	hence	the	ne-
cessity	of	episodic	memory.	In	a	sense	then,	social	eﬀects	of	this	sort	have	an	inherent	‘dual	
temporality’.	On	the	one	hand,	they	are	about	the	future:	A	promise	obliges	to	a	behavior,	
an	ownership	transfer	enTtles	the	beneﬁciary	to	privileged	use,	etc.	Nonetheless,	once	es-
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tablished,	the	existence	of	the	ensuing	obligaTons	and	enTtlements	can	be	jusTﬁed	or	
proven	only	by	reference	to	the	past	event	that	established	them.	Without	the	ability	to	
communicaTvely	refer	to	the	past,	such	pracTces	could	not	have	developed.	
Crucially,	it	is	exactly	because	of	the	dependence	on	tesTmony	of	these	causal	events	
that	socieTes	developed	ways	to	ensure	their	provability	by	recruiTng	witnesses	for	cere-
monies,	and	(only	more	recently)	by	creaTng	correlated	physical	eﬀects	of	these	‘non-physi-
cal’	causes	in	the	form	of	documents	(contracts,	cerTﬁcates,	memoranda,	bills,	records,	etc.;	
e.g.,	Basu	et	al.,	2009).	That	is,	the	ephemeral	nature	of	the	cause-eﬀect	relaTonship	in	so-
cial	commitments	induced	the	cultural	evoluTon	of	a	host	of	‘commitment	devices’	(Fessler	
&	Quintelier,	2013),	designed	to	alleviate	reliance	on	individual	memory	alone	by	requiring	
the	commitment	event	to	become	physically	traceable	in	one	form	or	another.	Further,	
events	grounding	explicit	commitments	are	oWen	ritually	structured	so	as	to	be	public	and	
easily	referable:	a	promise	is	accompanied	by	a	handshake,	a	marriage	by	a	ceremony,	etc.	
Making	a	commitment	public,	for	example,	not	only	increases	the	cost	of	possible	defecTon	
but	also	coordinates	the	representaTon	of	this	social	fact	in	the	community.	It	is	worth	not-
ing,	however,	that	while	unperceivable	social	facts	(ownership,	kinship	relaTons,	social	sta-
tus,	etc.)	are	frequently	signaled	publicly	to	make	sure	that	others	are	aware	of	them	with-
out	having	to	prove	them	again	and	again,	these	documents	do	not	simply	indicate	that	cer-
tain	social	facts	obtain	but	are	also	designed	to	prove	that	the	speciﬁc	cause	that	brought	
them	about	indeed	occurred	(this	is	why	date	and	place,	which	together	individuate	a	specif-
ic	episodic	event,	are	included	in	them).		
Before	we	conTnue,	let	us	recap	the	argument	we	have	developed	in	the	last	two	sec-
Tons.	InformaTon	about	speciﬁc,	past	events	can	be	used	for	various	purposes.	It	can	sup-
port	inducTve	inferences	about	projecTble	properTes	of	objects,	agents,	situaTons,	and	
causal	relaTons,	which	support	the	acquisiTon	of	generic	knowledge	about	kinds,	individu-
 23
als,	and	type	causal	relaTons.	However,	this	purpose	can	be	achieved	in	various	other	ways	
as	well,	and	so	it	does	not	require	the	preservaTon,	representaTon,	or	tesTmony	about,	past	
events.	A	special	subset	of	token	causal	events,	however,	produces	not	only	(or	no	traceable)	
physical	eﬀects	but	also	social	facts	that	allocate	enTtlements	and	obligaTons	to	speciﬁc	in-
dividuals	or	groups.	These	social	facts	are	generated	by	their	own	token	causes,	and	there-
fore	the	ulTmate	proof	of	their	existence	is	evidence	of	the	occurrence	of	these	token	
events.	Episodic	memory	and	tesTmony	of	past	events	can	thus	be	crucial	for	the	stable	
maintenance	of	such	social	facts	in	the	community	(see	below).	In	fact,	reliance	on	commu-
nicaTvely	established	commitments	(such	as	promises),	which	may	not	leave	any	physical	
trace	behind,	could	not	even	emerge	without	cogniTve	mechanisms	that	ground	both	
prospecTve	memory,	to	ensure	fulﬁllment,	and	retrospecTve	memory	and	tesTmony,	to	en-
sure	accountability.	
5.	The	Historicity	of	Social	Facts	
What	then	is	the	relaTonship	between	social	facts	(obligaTons,	enTtlements,	commitments,	
etc.)	and	episodic	memory?	It	has	been	proposed	that	memory	capaciTes	are	necessary	for	
enabling	certain	forms	of	social	interacTon	of	the	sort	‘who	did	what	to	whom’	(e.g.,	Stevens	
&	Hauser,	2004).	However,	tracking	social	relaTons	of	this	kind	can	also	be	accomplished	by	
cogniTve	‘bookkeeping’	mechanisms	that	keep	and	update	scores	of	interacTng	agents	upon	
each	encounter.	A	given	interacTon	would	then	be	interpreted	depending	on	the	score	of	
each	agent	involved	(e.g.,	Nowak	&	Sigmund,	1998).	In	this	way,	nothing	about	the	event	in	
quesTon	has	to	be	remembered,	because	its	outcome	simply	updates	such	a	score.	Say,	Isa	
lends	5	Euros	to	Rahmeed.	In	order	for	Rahmeed	to	reciprocate	and	pay	Isa	back,	all	he	has	
to	keep	in	memory	is	that	he	now	owes	Isa	5	Euros.	Nothing	else	about	the	lending	event	
itself	has	to	be	remembered.	
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A	number	of	diﬀerent	authors	have	proposed	that	such	a	tracking	mechanism	could	have	
been	implemented	through	an	‘antudinal’	(Brosnan	&	DeWaal,	2002)	or	emoTonal	scoring	
system	in	non-human	animals	(Schino	&	Aureli,	2009;	see	also	Gervais	&	Fessler,	2016).	It	is	
likely	that	in	many	situaTons	exchange-related	informaTon	is	tracked	in	a	similar	manner	in	
humans	(Bell	et	al.,	2017;	for	a	modeling	approach	related	to	this	issue	see	Kleiman-Weiner	
et	al.,	2016).	The	representaTon	of	speciﬁc,	past	events	is	therefore	not	a	requirement	for	
maintaining	stable	pairwise	social	relaTons.	Learning	from	‘exchange	events’	is	similar	to	
learning	from	events	which	have	no	social	consequences:	one	can	draw	inferences	from	
such	events	without	storing	much	of	what	happened.	
While	commitments	and	enTtlements	can	only	ulTmately	be	proven	by	reference	to	spe-
ciﬁc	past	events,	the	representaTon	of	their	existence	does	not	depend	on	the	capacity	to	
recall	speciﬁc	past	events.	In	order	to	know	that	John	owns	his	car,	you	do	not	have	to	re-
member	anything	about	the	event	in	which	he	acquired	it	(even	though	you	have	to	assume	
that	there	was	such	an	event).	Why	should	the	transmission	of	the	privately	represented	so-
cial	eﬀects	of	a	given	event	be	important	then?		
5.1.	Maintaining	and	stabilizing	social	facts	
The	social	eﬀects	produced	by	ordinary	physical	or	biological	events	have	to	be	main-
tained	by	some	forms	of	public	representaTon,	such	as	face-to-face	communicaTon.	AWer	
all,	they	oWen	exist	only	in	the	minds	of	individuals,	and	communicaTon	is	the	main	means	
by	which	these	eﬀects	become	and	remain	shared.	If	they	are	not	shared,	social	facts	do	not	
fulﬁll	their	funcTon,	so	it	is	in	everyone’s	interest	to	coordinate	them	appropriately.		
Put	diﬀerently,	in	order	to	become	social	facts,	the	privately	represented	social	eﬀects	of	
events	have	to	be	shared	and	agreement	about	them	has	to	be	established.	Ownership,	so-
cial	structure,	and	social	roles	are	good	examples	here:	they	may	also	be	marked	by	perma-
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nent	public	signals	to	ensure	common	acceptance	even	in	the	absence	of	direct	verbal	
communicaTon.	Social	facts	such	as	these	may	be	generated	by	token	causes,	but	their	
shared	maintenance	depends	on	communicaTon,	and	if	their	existence	is	disputed,	they	can	
be	negoTated	by	reference	to	the	events	that	brought	them	about.	Social	facts	inherently	
depend	on	public	agreement,	and	to	achieve	such	agreement,	the	past	events	grounding	a	
given	fact	have	to	be	available.	This	is	important	not	only	in	cases	of	conﬂict.	Rather,	it	is	
simply	not	possible	to	decide	privately	whether	a	given	social	fact	indeed	applies.	While	one	
can	represent	a	social	fact	as	such	without	entertaining	the	(historical)	reasons	why	it	ob-
tains,	in	communicaTon	such	reasons	might	have	to	be	explicitly	invoked	as	the	ulTmate	ar-
gument	for	its	existence.		
Crucially,	for	humans,	an	event	can	be	ambiguous	as	to	what	social	implicaTons	it	estab-
lishes.	A	given	episode	is	oWen	important	not	just	because	of	factual	occurrences	but	for	the	
myriad	ways	in	which	these	events	could	have	turned	out.	What	a	person	did	not	do,	and	
what	her	intenTons	were	in	acTng,	for	example,	are	essenTal	in	compuTng	the	ways	in	
which	commitments	should	be	distributed	(e.g.	Gerstenberg	et	al.,	2018).	While	humans	
have	a	host	of	specialized	cogniTve	mechanisms	that	enables	them	to	carry	out	such	compu-
taTons	online,	the	transmission	of	the	conclusion	will	oWen	require	jusTﬁcaTon.	DisTnguish-
ing	between,	for	example,	incompetence	and	malevolence	will	someTmes	require	that	one	
refers	to	details	of	the	speciﬁc	acTon	in	quesTon.	While	malevolence	should	trigger	punish-
ment	or	ostracism,	incompetence	does	not	necessarily	call	for	these	reacTons	(see	Nowak	&	
Sigmund,	2005	for	why	the	ability	to	make	such	a	disTncTon	might	be	important).	The	social	
coordinaTon	of	the	representaTons	of	implicaTons	of	speciﬁc	events	will	thus	oWen	un-
avoidably	require	communicaTon	about	such	events	(for	a	similar	point	see	Pietraszewski,	
2016).		
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TesTmony,	therefore,	helps	to	maintain	and	coordinate	the	validity	of	enTtlements,	ob-
ligaTons,	and	commitments	within	a	social	group.	While	it	might	also	serve	other	important	
funcTons,	tesTmony	can	play	a	‘signaling’	role	in	adverTsing	the	existence	of	certain	social	
facts:	I	claim	that	this	knife	is	mine	and	I	jusTfy	it	by	the	fact	that	I	made	it,	or	that	I	inherited	
it,	or	that	it	was	donated	to	me,	etc.	It	does	not	necessarily	require	an	open	challenge	or	vi-
olaTon	of	property	rights	to	make	these	asserTons;	in	the	absence	of	a	permanent	symbol	
system	to	mark	ownership	and	other	enTtlements,	repeated	declaraTons	of	social	facts	may	
be	necessary	to	maintain	their	shared	nature	and	to	let	newcomers	know	about	them.	
Note	that	this	conclusion	does	not	require	that	communicaTvely	coordinaTng	social	facts	
should	always,	or	even	necessarily,	involve	poinTng	to	speciﬁc	past	events.	AWer	all,	beliefs	
can	be	transmijed	on	the	basis	of	trust	alone,	without	requiring	the	representaTon	or	
transmission	of	reasons.	Moreover,	social	eﬀects	aﬀecTng	a	whole	community	are	common-
ly	structured	so	as	to	be	purposefully	independent	of	individual	tesTmony.	Events	establish-
ing	important	social	eﬀects	are	ritualized	or	designed	so	as	to	generate	public	knowledge	
from	the	outset	by	either	generaTng	concomitant	physical	eﬀects	(e.g.,	documents)	or	many	
witnesses.	In	this	case,	tesTmony	becomes	less	important. 	In	fact,	the	moTvaTon	to	make	8
such	events	independent	of	individual	tesTmony	has	likely	lead	to	the	development	of	tech-
nologies	allowing	for	the	generaTon	of	public	knowledge.		
Once	public	knowledge	about	a	given	social	fact	has	been	established	it	will	rarely	be	
challenged:	marriages	or	kinship	relaTons	rarely,	if	ever,	become	a	majer	of	dispute.	There-
	Events	that	only	aﬀect	a	subset	of	group	members	are	therefore	oWen	more	likely	to	become	the	subject	of	8
transmission	by	tesTmony	because	these	are	oWen	not	structured	so	as	to	produce	public	knowledge	or	leave	
intenTonal	records.	This	is	another	reason	why	tesTmony	about	other	group	members	is	common	in	gossip:	
this	informaTon	is	not	just	interesTng	because	it	potenTally	allows	interlocutors	to	draw	trait	inferences	but	
also	because	of	the	fact	that	we	can	eﬀecTvely	transmit	commitments,	enTtlements,	accountabiliTes	etc.	in	
this	way.	The	fact	that	the	mayor	has	been	cheaTng	on	his	wife	with	his	secretary,	for	example,	will	likely	be-
come	the	subject	of	tesTmony	of	individual	community	members	while	the	fact	that	he	is	the	mayor	(while	
similarly	dependent	on	a	speciﬁc	past	event)	will	rarely	have	to	be	tesTﬁed	to	because	commonly	everyone	
already	knows	about	it	and	there	are	documents	proving	it.
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fore,	social	eﬀects	that	aﬀect	the	whole	community	will	oWen	not	depend	on	tesTmony	to	
be	maintained	because	they	generate	public	knowledge	or	are	otherwise	made	traceable	for	
everyone.	One	reason	for	this,	however,	is	that	they	are	assumed	to	be	ulTmately	appropri-
ately	jusTﬁed	by	past	events,	which	can	be	made	available	in	one	form	or	another	in	case	of	
doubt.	Only	the	possibility	of	poinTng	to	the	establishing	event	in	any	given	case	ensures	
that	disagreements	about	the	fact	in	quesTon	could	be	resolved	in	principle.	Many	social	
facts	are	simply	such	that	only	their	establishing	event	can	ulTmately	arbiter	whether	(or	in	
what	way)	they	obtain.	If	there	was	no	way	to	refer	to	or	to	make	available	these	events,	
there	would	be	no	way	to	ulTmately	ensure	the	appropriateness	of	claims	about	such	social	
facts,	and	consequently	to	jusTfy	the	ensuing	enTtlements	and	to	enforce	their	fulﬁllment.		
Nonetheless,	if	our	analysis	here	is	correct	then	the	capacity	for	tesTmony,	underpinned	
by	human	episodic	memory,	must	have	enabled	the	capacity	for	coordinaTng	certain	social	
facts	in	the	ﬁrst	place,	and	for	generaTng	new	types	of	social	facts	that	could	not	even	exist	
without	tesTmony.	The	reason	for	this	is	not	that	such	commitments	require	episodic	mem-
ory	to	be	cogniTvely	traceable	and	behaviorally	implementable	by	the	individuals	involved.	
Rather,	they	require	tesTmony	to	be	shared	in	a	community.	This	is	because	in	some	cases	
there	could	be	no	fact	of	the	majer	whether	a	given	obligaTon,	enTtlement	or	commitment	
applies	without	the	potenTal	of	tesTmony	about	the	speciﬁc,	past	event	causally	grounding	
the	social	eﬀect	under	dispute.		
5.2.	Mo1vated	remembering,	memory	bias,	and	narra1vity	
The	above	argument	predicts	that	episodic	memory	is	moTvated	(and	hence	to	some	
extent	biased)	by	design	so	as	to	jusTfy	one’s	own	present	enTtlements	(see	also	Lambek,	
1996).	Mahr	and	Csibra	(2018)	argued	that	one	way	in	which	such	a	bias	manifests	is	
through	‘recollecTve	my-side	bias.’	Episodic	memory	construcTon	is	more	likely	to	conﬁrm	
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and	support	our	prior	beliefs	than	to	contradict	them.	However,	this	might	not	be	the	only	
source	of	architectural	bias	in	episodic	memory.	Episodes	are	neither	retrieved	nor	commu-
nicated	as	atomized	parTcles	but	as	narraTves.	TesTmony	is	not	just	given	as	a	series	of	
proposiTons	but	it	is	narraTvized	in	a	way	that	makes	it	more	likely	for	the	audience	to	draw	
certain	inferences	over	others.	According	to	Keven	(2016;	Keven	et	al.,	2017),	episodic	
memory	retrieval	includes	a	mechanism	(referred	to	as	‘narraTve	binding’)	connecTng	iso-
lated	event	representaTons	by	inferring	not	only	temporal	(‘X	happened	before/aWer	Y’)	but	
also	causal	(‘X	occurred	because	of	Y’)	and	teleological	(‘X	occurred	so	as	to	bring	about	Y’)	
relaTons	between	them.	On	this	view,	episodic	memories	allow	us	to	understand	the	past	so	
as	to	make	sense	in	light	of	causal	and	teleological	relaTons	between	diﬀerent	events	as	well	
as	their	connecTon	to	the	present	(Bien,	Tilston,	&	Bangerter,	2018).		
How	did	I	get	to	work	this	morning?	I	went	to	the	bus	stop	to	get	the	bus	at	7:45	but	the	
stop	was	closed	because	of	a	construcTon	site	and	so	I	had	to	take	the	metro	to	work	in-
stead.	Already	this	minimalisTc	account	of	the	events	of	this	morning	includes	a	signiﬁcant	
amount	of	selecTon	and	interpretaTon	in	so	far	as	certain	events	and	their	causal/teleologi-
cal	relaTons	are	highlighted	and	others	leW	out.	In	order	to	eﬀecTvely	argue	for	the	validity	
of	a	given	social	fact,	making	the	temporal	relaTons	between	events	available	is	not	enough.	
Instead,	we	have	to	be	able	to	bind	events	in	a	way	that	highlights	the	causal	connecTons	in	
quesTon	(e.g.,	having	been	forced	to	change	the	mode	of	transport	this	morning	added	de-
lay	to	my	travel	and	caused	me	to	be	late	for	work).	NarraTve	binding	processes	therefore	
always	include	a	modicum	of	interpretaTon:	relaTng	events	causally	and	teleologically	in-
cludes	a	selecTon	process	in	which	certain	events	are	highlighted	over	others.	NarraTves	are	
oWen	eﬀecTve	because	they	display	events	as	being	(causally	and	teleologically)	related	in	a	
way	that	suggests	certain	conclusions	over	others.	The	fact	that	episodic	memory	is	narra-
Tvized	and	oWen	biased	in	favor	of	present	believes,	antudes,	and	goals	(Anderson	&	
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Haslmayr,	2014;	Coman	et	al.,	2014;	Conway,	2005;	Kappes	&	Crocket,	2016)	follows	from	its	
crucial	communicaTve	role	in	establishing	social	facts	in	the	present	through	reference	to	
history.	Thus,	on	our	account,	remembering	(both	individually	and	collecTvely)	does	not	
necessarily	only	or	even	primarily	funcTon	to	produce	an	accurate	representaTon	of	the	
past. 		9
Moreover,	our	account	provides	a	new	perspecTve	on	the	quesTon	of	why	we	care	so	
much	about	the	accuracy	of	our	representaTons	of	the	past	in	the	ﬁrst	place.	Phenomena	of	
memory	fallibility	and	inaccuracy	contributed	to	the	birth	of	experimental	psychology	
(Ebbinghaus,	1885;	Bartlej,	1932)	and	conTnue	to	consTtute	one	of	its	major	areas	of	re-
search	(e.g.	Schacter,	2001;	Kurkela	&	Dennis,	2016).	More	generally,	humans	have	devoted	
enTre	academic	ﬁelds	to	the	accurate	reconstrucTon	of	history.	While	humans	surely	have	a	
general	instrumental	interest	in	the	accuracy	of	their	representaTons,	to	the	extent	that	
humans	in	general	(and	academics	in	parTcular)	have	a	special	interest	in	the	accuracy	of	
representaTons	of	the	past,	this	interest	is	likely	at	least	partly	explained	by	the	social	im-
portance	of	the	past	for	the	present.	
5.3.	Accountability	judgments	and	the	role	of	social	norms	
One	might	propose	that	tesTmony	not	only	plays	a	role	in	signaling	and	coordinaTng	the	
validity	of	social	facts,	as	we	argued	above,	but	is	moreover	of	crucial	importance	in	the	en-
forcement	of	social	norms	themselves.	AWer	all,	the	context	in	which	tesTmony	seems	to	
majer	most	in	contemporary	socieTes	is	the	legal	domain.	TesTmony	has	been	invesTgated	
by	cogniTve	psychologists	mostly	in	the	form	of	eyewitness	tesTmony	for	crimes	(e.g.,	
Neisser,	1981;	Wright	et	al.,	2009),	and	ethnographic	accounts	have	oWen	parTcularly	fo-
	For	a	more	in-depth	discussion	of	the	accuracy-construcTvness	(or,	as	Conway,	2005	calls	it	“coherence-corre9 -
spondence”)	trade-oﬀ	as	well	as	diﬀerent	memory	errors	not	menToned	here	and	how	they	relate	to	the	cur-
rent	perspecTve,	see	Mahr	and	Csibra	(2018).
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cused	on	the	role	of	witnesses	in	the	legal	domain	(e.g.,	Gluckman,	1955).	Thinking	about	
the	relaTonship	between	our	capacity	for	tesTmony	and	norm	enforcement,	one	might	thus	
conclude	that	tesTmony	enables	the	enforcement	of	social	norms	by	informing	others	about	
the	violaTon	of	those	norms.	Without	the	ability	to	share	informaTon	about	such	violaTons,	
people	would	always	be	dependent	on	ﬁrst-hand	experience	in	judging	whether	a	norm	has	
been	violated,	which	would	not	make	it	possible	for	norms	to	be	widely	enforced	by	third	
parTes/communiTes	in	general.	
In	our	view,	however,	the	role	that	tesTmony	plays	in	norm	enforcement	is	just	a	special	
case	of	the	more	general	role	we	have	outlined	above.	In	essence,	sharing	event	informaTon	
perTnent	to	norm	violaTons	aims	to	transmit	a	judgment	-	an	accountability	judgment	-	to	
establish	a	social	fact	about	such	accountability.	That	is,	while	accountability	judgments	as	
such	are	private,	they	can	be	jusTﬁed	and	thereby	transmijed	to	others	by	poinTng	to	the	
event	in	which	a	norm	was	violated. 	The	transmission	of	such	a	judgment	aims	to	establish	10
a	shared	representaTon	of	accountability,	through	which	it	would	become	a	social	fact.	The	
enforcement	of	the	norm	in	quesTon,	however,	may	follow	from	the	accountability	judg-
ment	itself,	not	from	its	transmission.	Only	once	accountability	has	been	established	and	is	
shared	within	a	group,	norm	enforcement	may	ensue.	The	transmission	of	the	norm	viola-
Ton	event	only	serves	to	coordinate	the	representaTon	of	accountability	and	is	not	directly	
involved	in	the	enforcement	of	the	norm.		
Thus,	tesTmony	is	common	in	the	social	negoTaTon	of	accountability	judgments	be-
cause	addiTonal	reassurance	in	communicaTon	about	the	past	is	required	when	the	stakes	
are	high.	Arguably,	as	the	domain	of	norm	enforcement	has	become	insTtuTonalized,	the	
forms	in	which	tesTmony	is	given	in	this	context	(e.g.,	as	‘eye	witness	tesTmony’	under	oath,	
	Again,	while	these	events	will	commonly	be	acTons,	they	do	not	have	to	be	(the	absence	of	acTon,	for	ex10 -
ample,	can	just	as	well	lead	to	accountability).
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etc.)	have	become	cultural	insTtuTons,	too.	Norm	enforcement	is	facilitated	through	tesT-
mony	because	the	fact	of	a	norm	being	violated	is	someTmes	not	physically	traceable.	In	
fact,	contrary	to	other	domains,	accountability	transmission	can	hardly	be	alleviated	from	its	
dependence	on	tesTmony	through	cultural	or	technological	soluTons	in	principle:	norm	vio-
laTons	are	usually	carried	out	in	a	way	that	avoids	their	publicity	or	documentaTon.	
TesTmony,	therefore,	will	oWen	help	in	jusTfying	and	determining	punishment.	In	es-
sence,	however,	norm	enforcement	and	our	capacity	for	tesTmony	are	not	dependent	on	
one	another.	Norms	can	be	enforced	without	the	involvement	of	tesTmony,	and	tesTmony	is	
eﬀecTve	and	occurs	outside	the	domain	of	norm	violaTons	and	their	enforcement.	It	is	im-
portant	to	note	here,	however,	that,	the	role	of	tesTmony	in	the	transmission	and	coordina-
Ton	of	social	facts,	depends,	to	some	extent,	on	social	norms	in	the	ﬁrst	place.	AWer	all,	
what	social	consequences	follow	from	a	given	event	is	commonly	governed	by	social	norms.	
For	example,	in	East	Timor	land	ownership	is	negoTated	based	on	a	norm	of	ﬁrst	posses-
sion	(Fitzpatrick	&	Barnes,	2010). 	Due	to	such	a	norm,	it	becomes	relevant	who	(or	whose	11
ancestors)	ﬁrst	sejled	on	a	given	piece	of	land	in	deciding	disputes	about	land	ownership.	
This	parTcular	past	event	would,	however,	enTrely	lose	its	importance	as	a	way	of	determin-
ing	present	land	ownership	in	the	absence	of	a	norm	of	ﬁrst	possession.		
It	follows	from	this	point	that	our	propensity	to	represent	(and	observe)	social	norms	
must	have	existed	prior	to	the	emergence	of	the	role	of	tesTmony	outlined	here.	
Nonetheless,	while	tesTmony	might	not	play	a	role	in	the	enforcement	of	social	norms	
and	commitments,	it	certainly	makes	them	more	eﬀecTve.	Our	capacity	to	bear	tesTmony	
changes	the	dynamics	of	social	interacTons	in	crucial	ways.	The	possibility	of	tesTmony	
transforms	the	pay-oﬀ	structure	of	two-person	interacTons	into	one	in	which	third-parTes	
	The	idea	of	ﬁrst	possession	as	a	guide	to	ownership	seems	to	emerge	cross-culturally	in	human	development	11
by	around	8	years	of	age	(Nancekivelli,	Friedman,	&	Gelman,	2019).
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are	always	at	least	potenTally	present.	In	fact,	(the	possibility	of)	report	has	been	shown	to	
be	highly	eﬀecTve	in	promoTng	cooperaTon	(e.g.,	Wu,	Balliet,	&	Van	Lange,	2015;	2016b).		
People	intensely	care	about	whether	their	behavior	is	being	witnessed	by	others	and	this	
concern	emerges	relaTvely	early	in	development:	By	the	age	of	ﬁve,	children	have	de-
veloped	a	robust	sense	of	the	consequences	of	someone	else	witnessing	their	norm	viola-
Tons	(and	the	communicaTve	forms	of	aggression	that	can	ensue)	and	adjust	their	behaviors	
accordingly.	Five-year-olds	behave	more	prosocially	in	the	presence	of	peers	(Engelmann,	
Herrmann,	&	Tomasello,	2012),	when	they	believe	to	be	watched	(Piazza,	Bering,	&	Ingram,	
2011),	or	when	their	acTons	are	witnessed	by	others	(Leimgruber,	Shaw,	Santos,	&	Olson,	
2012).	On	the	one	hand,	these	eﬀects	are	likely	to	be	due	to	the	fact	that	witnessing	
someone’s	behavior	might	cause	third-parTes	to	draw	inferences	about	their	traits	and	ac-
countabiliTes.	On	the	other	hand,	people	are	likely	aware	that	witnesses	could	pass	on	their	
evaluaTons	via	tesTmony.	This	would	spread	their	judgments	to	the	community,	which	
might	in	turn	moTvate	alliance	recruitment	against	the	observed	individuals	(Pietraszewski,	
2016;	Boehm,	2012)	and	potenTally	inﬂuence	their	reputaTon.	In	fact,	gossip	is	likely	to	play	
an	important	role	in	this	process:	While	(as	discussed	above)	gossip	regulates	the	spread	of	
reputaTonal	informaTon,	it	also	serves	as	a	norm	enforcing	device	by	transminng	others’	
accountabiliTes	through	reference	to	norm	violaTng	behaviors.	
6.	Conclusion	
The	main	aim	of	this	arTcle	has	been	to	give	an	account	of	the	role	of	representaTons	of	the	
past	that	makes	it	intelligible	why	it	has	such	a	special	status	for	humans.	The	past	plays	a	
parTcularly	crucial	role	in	human	social	life.	For	humans,	events	do	not	only	have	eﬀects	in	
their	physical	but	also	in	their	social	environment.	The	representaTon	of	such	eﬀects	im-
pacts	our	future	ﬁtness	to	the	extent	that	we	can	establish	the	validity	of	the	ensuing	social	
 33
eﬀects	with	others.	Commonly,	the	only	way	this	can	be	achieved	is	by	retrospecTvely	point-
ing	to	the	event	that	produced	the	social	eﬀect	in	the	ﬁrst	place.	For	this	reason,	the	past	
becomes	highly	important	to	us	and	is	also	so	frequently	contested.	It	is	this	circumstance	
that	makes	the	ability	to	remember	the	past	in	episodic	memory	parTcularly	beneﬁcial.	
Episodic	memory	allows	one	to	become	a	witness	of	the	past	and	give	tesTmony	
about	it.	TesTmony	is	a	way	to	facilitate	the	transmission	of	informaTon	about	past	events	
by	conferring	epistemic	authority	and	increasing	speaker	commitment.	Such	facilitaTon	is	
required	in	cases	in	which	one’s	audience	requires	addiTonal	reassurance	about	whatever	
one	is	asserTng.	Given	the	extraordinary	importance	of	representaTons	about	the	past	in	
deciding	what	social	realiTes	apply	in	the	present,	we	should	expect	claims	about	history	to	
be	a	context	in	which	listeners	regularly	require	such	addiTonal	reassurance.	
TesTmony	will	thereby	be	most	important	in	the	negoTaTon	and	transmission	of	our	
own	and	others’	commitments,	enTtlements,	and	accountabiliTes.	CommunicaTvely	point-
ing	to	the	past	allows	us	to	jusTfy	asserTons	about	the	existence	of	social	facts,	and	a	large	
range	of	cultural	pracTces	has	developed	exactly	to	alleviate	the	reliance	of	social	reality	on	
individual	memory	and	tesTmony.		
This	view	has	consequences	for	how	the	evoluTon	of	episodic	memory	(the	cogniTve	
basis	of	tesTmony)	must	have	looked	like.	Episodic	memory	might	have	developed	only	once	
humans	were	able	to	represent	the	social	eﬀects	of	the	events	in	their	environment.	This	
ability,	however,	must	have	required	the	prior	emergence	of	social	norms	determining	these	
social	cause-eﬀect	relaTonships.	If	no	one	represented	or	followed	social	norms,	the	past	
would	lose	its	importance	as	a	way	of	coordinaTng	social	realiTes.	Once	in	place,	our	ability	
to	tesTfy	about	past	events	could	then	have	also	be	used	to	transmit	generic	beliefs	to	oth-
ers	and	thereby	make	reputaTon	disseminaTon	more	eﬀecTve.	
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